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Abstract 
Discursive choices made by policy entrepreneurs are an important factor in the development of 
climate change acts (CCAs). This article examines the extent to which such choices reflect the strategic 
need for CCA entrepreneurs to compromise pragmatically and modulate their policy preferences in 
order to secure the agreement needed for CCA adoption. Drawing upon theoretical insights from 
discursive institutionalism (DI) and policy entrepreneurship, this article analyses discursive choices 
during negotiations surrounding the New Zealand Zero Carbon Act (ZCA). The analysis shows that 
endogenous political-ideological constraints compelled entrepreneurial actors to modify first-choice 
preferences for emissions reduction legislation by reframing their coordinative discursive 
interventions to accommodate potentially oppositional groups. Further research is required into the 
conditions under which such strategies become discursively operational, to provide guidance to 
climate policy entrepreneurs as CCAs continue to diffuse globally. 
Key policy insights 
• Strategic compromise by climate advocates is crucial to the passage of enduring legislation. 
• Climate policy entrepreneurs’ decisions about how and when to compromise to ensure 
legislation may have significant implications for climate policy efficacy and political durability. 
• Compromises may only defer rather than diffuse underlying political tensions but can enable 
CCA adoption so as to reshape political contexts in the longer-term. 
• Future research can inform climate policy advocacy strategies that aim to balance ambition 
and durability. 
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1 Introduction 
In November 2019, New Zealand passed the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act 
(Zero Carbon Act (ZCA)), enshrining a legal commitment to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. The 
ZCA represented landmark legislation not just because of its intent but also because it enjoyed cross-
party support from the Labour-led government and the opposition National Party after a decade of 
partisan wrangling over climate policy (Ainge Roy, 2019). In June 2020, Parliament also passed the 
Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading Reform) Amendment Bill (ETR Bill) to strengthen New 
Zealand’s mainstay policy instrument for reducing emissions. This time, however, the National Party 
voted against the legislation, arguing that New Zealand should not commit to pricing livestock and 
fertiliser emissions or higher emissions trading scheme (ETS) prices until the economic impact of 
Covid-19 was better understood (Wannan, 2020). 
Our empirical questions on how cross-party agreement on the approach to New Zealand climate policy 
occurred and came under strain so quickly afterwards feed into our main analytical question: how do 
discursive choices made by climate policy entrepreneurs contribute to reconfiguring political debate 
on the adoption and design of Climate Change Acts (CCAs)? The role of framing and discourse in 
shaping conditions for climate legislation has been analysed extensively (Carter and Jacobs, 2014; 
Christoff, 2013; Gillard, 2016; Inderberg and Bailey, 2019; Lockwood, 2013; Lorenzoni and Benson, 
2014). Research has shown how recasting climate change from an environmental to an economic 
frame can enable CCA advocates to emphasise the socio-economic benefits of decarbonisation (Carter 
and Jacobs, 2014). Other studies, however, demonstrate how alternative discourses on the costs and 
distributional effects of long-term emissions targets can strain cross-party agreement over CCAs 
(Gillard, 2016; Lockwood, 2013). In both cases, the discursive choices made by policy entrepreneurs 
seeking to shape political debate and legislative responses to climate change, and associated 
structural constraints, remain significant factors in CCA development but further work is needed to 
deepen understanding of the decisions CCA advocates face about compromising with other actors, 
particularly where major shifts in cooperation are needed.  
Compromise occupies a necessary and central role in democratic politics (Bellamy et al, 2012), but 
decisions about whether, how and when actors choose to compromise have particular pertinence for 
CCAs because decisions at one juncture may create multi-decadal precedents for future institutional 
conditions and policy options. Inherent to the CCA concept is the idea that the self-reinforcing path-
dependencies created by long-term policy commitments and mechanisms means that, within reason, 
a flawed but agreed CCA may be preferable to something perfect that never materialises (Levin et al., 
2012; Rietig and Laing, 2017; Rosenbloom et al., 2019). 
To explore how such decisions shaped the development and adoption of the New Zealand framework 
climate legislation, we draw on ideas from discursive institutionalism (DI) about how institutions 
respond to, reshape and constrain ideas to analyse the different ideas policy entrepreneurs utilise to 
champion policy change. These range from philosophical ideas to detailed policy ideas, and the 
interactions through which policy élites communicate with general audiences and coordinate the 
preferences and expectations of other policy actors (Schmidt, 2002, 2008). By developing a framework 
that combines DI with the concept of policy entrepreneurship, we consider both the content and 
context of policy discourse from a strategic perspective. 
Section 2 explains the DI framework in more detail. Section 3 then describes data sources and process-
tracing methods, before Section 4 outlines the New Zealand climate policy context ZCA advocates 
needed to navigate. Section 5 discusses the findings, paying particular attention to the role of 
compromise in policy actors’ discursive strategies. Section 6 concludes with lessons gained and 
 
 
suggests that focusing on the role of compromise provides new insights into the ability of climate 
change advocates to contribute to enduring and progressive climate legislation.  
2 Framework 
The theoretical framework developed from the DI and climate-energy policy literature categorises the 
strategic choices made by climate policy entrepreneurs by focussing on policy discourse as a primary 
strategic tool. In so doing, we emphasise the often pivotal choices about when and how to 
compromise with others in the exercise of political agency.  
2.1 Consensus or compromise  
The policy process is one of the main means by which policy disagreements are resolved in pluralist 
liberal democracies.  Actors seeking to influence the form of agreements during policy processes face 
choices about the type of resolution they seek which, we argue, can take the form of either consensus 
or compromise outcomes. Compromise outcomes here refer to situations where participants are 
willing to agree to an outcome they regard as non-optimal but better than no agreement. Compromise 
outcomes contrast with consensus outcomes where relevant parties agree that a course of action is 
optimal (May, 2011; Rossi, 2013; Weinstock, 2013; 2017).  
Using these definitions, actors may seek consensus in two types of situation. The first is where they 
do not perceive a need to compromise to secure an agreement, either because the terms of 
agreement are non-controversial, or because they judge they can persuade or influence others to 
accept the superiority of their preferred outcome. The second is where the cost of compromise is 
greater than the cost of failing to find agreement, based on either a pragmatic calculation or an 
unwillingness to violate moral or ethical principles (May, 2005). An actor who attempts - but fails - to 
build consensus for their preferred result risks an outcome where no agreement is reached, or their 
isolation from the policy discourse leading to an agreement over which they have had no influence. 
In contrast, decisions to pursue compromise reflect assessments by actors that they are unable to 
realise an agreement that fully reflects their first preferences and that the cost of the compromise to 
secure non-optimal agreement is less than the cost of no agreement or the actor’s marginalisation 
from the decision process. Compromise may represent either a straightforward material concession 
or the re-framing of their position to better align with the terms of the policy debate. An example of 
the latter form of compromise might be the reframing of climate change from a moral to an economic 
issue. 
2.2 Institutions, ideas, and discursive interaction 
Discursive institutionalism has its roots in constructivist understandings of how institutions respond 
to ideas embedded in discourse (Peters, 2019) and has been used widely to examine how 
entrepreneurial political actors involved in climate and energy governance manipulate ideas (Fitch-
Roy et al., 2020; Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014). It proposes that actors exercise agency through both 
their ‘background ideational abilities’, which allow action within the constraints of existing contexts, 
and their ‘foreground discursive abilities’ that enable them to think outside their institutional context 
and communicate to change or maintain those institutions (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314, 2017). 
DI examines ideas at several levels. Policy ideas are the most specific and relate mainly to policy 
provisions. Programmatic ideas underpin policy ideas and set out problems to be solved by policies. 
Finally, philosophical ideas can be seen as ‘deep core’ ideas that are rarely contested by their 
 
 
adherents (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). Schmidt also distinguishes between ‘cognitive’ ideas (indicating 
‘what is or what to do’) and ‘normative’ ideas (‘what one ought to do’) (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). 
Cognitive ideas thus provide the methods or procedures for political action and, at the programmatic 
level, may define the problems to be solved and indicate solutions. By contrast, normative ideas 
provide values to underpin political action and validate policies. 
Finally, ‘discourse’ centres on the processes through which actors interact and ideas are generated, 
deliberated, legitimated, and agreed upon (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). ‘Coordinative’ discourse focuses on 
dialogue between direct participants in the policy process, usually political élites: elected officials, civil 
servants, and interest groups (Schmidt, 2002; 2008). ‘Communicative’ discourse, meanwhile, focuses 
on conveying ideas to wider public audiences, and encompasses a wider range of political actors (such 
as political leaders, policy forums, and informed publics) who bring forward ideas developed through 
coordinative discourse for public deliberation and legitimation. 
2.3 Entrepreneurship: agency and power 
The DI literature ascribes an important role to policy entrepreneurs ‘… as catalysts for change [who] 
draw on and articulate the ideas of discursive communities and coalitions’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 310). 
These actors invest time and effort in identifying, analysing, and advancing particular problems on the 
policy agenda and offering solutions (Béland and Katapally, 2018; Capano and Galanti, 2020). They 
often achieve greater results than their material resources suggest (Boasson and Huitema, 2017), by 
using their discursive abilities to facilitate cooperation within and between groups, build and maintain 
institutions, and reshape policy debates through creating new forms of meaning that attract other 
political actors (Fligstein, 2001, p. 106). This may necessitate developing frames and narratives that 
resonate with others’ ‘identity, belief, and interests, while …using those same stories to frame action 
against various opponents’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, p. 50). 
Power in DI is often, therefore, ideational. Power is exerted ‘when actors seek to influence the beliefs 
of other [actors] by promoting their own ideas at the expense of other [ideas]’ (Carstensen and 
Schmidt, 2016, p. 322). Thus, agency to shape policy is partially contingent on strategically 
manipulating ideas. Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) identify three ‘types’ of ideational power:  
i. power through ideas: persuading others to accept an argument by invoking ideas;  
ii. power over ideas: imposing particular meanings on others, either directly or by resisting 
alternative ideas;  
iii. power in ideas: institutionalising ideational structures in ways that narrow the scope for other 
ideas to gain purchase.  
Strategic decisions by policy entrepreneurs consequently hinge on which ideational power resources 
they possess. They may develop what they perceive as the ‘killer argument’ for their preferred 
outcome, or be an especially persuasive political operative, and seek to exert ‘power through ideas’. 
Alternatively, they may have the capacity to impose ideas through control of the communicative 
discourse in media channels or to ‘shame’ others by developing a powerful normative idea that others 
cannot rebut; as seen in the moral authority of some social movements. The recourse here is to ‘power 
over ideas’, emphasising compulsion rather than persuasion. Finally, ‘power in ideas’ suggests that 
actors may enjoy deeper structural or institutional support for their preferred idea. Underlying social, 
political, and intellectual landscapes inevitably place some ideas within or outside the realm of topics 
that may be fruitfully discussed. That some ideas may be implicitly or explicitly considered indefensible 
may result from historical path dependency or the predominance of particular frames or modes of 
thought (Bailey and Wilson, 2009). 
 
 
Not all actors have access to equivalent ideational power resources: this depends largely on 
hierarchical or institutional status. Since climate policy entrepreneurs are expected to operate with 
extraordinary proficiency relative to their role (Boasson & Huitema, 2017), policy entrepreneurs are 
less likely to flex power ‘in’ or ‘over’ ideas that relate more to status than skill. A reasonable 
expectation is for policy entrepreneurship to rely heavily on powers of persuasion ‘through ideas’. 
However, one objective of persuasion through ideas is to alter the terms of the policy debate and 
increase the power in a particular idea or ideas set. 
Policy entrepreneurs’ strategic decision-making therefore demands assessment of the distribution of 
ideational power resources, which itself necessitates evaluation of the political context, each actor’s 
position within that context, and each actor’s political abilities and policy preferences. Actors seeking 
influence must continually reappraise these conditions and, at each iteration, choose between one of 
two basic categories of action: to pursue their ‘ideal’ outcomes; or concede ideational or material 
ground to secure progress and avoid ‘the perfect becoming the enemy of the good’. We therefore 
emphasise the strategic considerations facing policy entrepreneurs when deciding when to 
compromise by modulating their preferences or reframing their arguments. Across DI’s ideational 
levels, the pursuit of consensus outcomes may be more likely when philosophical ideas are at stake, 
while compromise outcomes may be more common when philosophical ideas are unthreatened or 
there are severe reputational or material consequences of not reaching an agreement. Examining the 
terms of policy discourse across all three levels allows us to use the framework to illuminate the 
‘depth’ of the political agreements that drive policy outcomes. 
Table 1 sets out the two broad categories of agreement an actor may choose to pursue, alongside the 
implications for the two main components of agency in DI: the background ideational abilities through 
which an assessment of the context is formed, and the foreground discursive abilities that allow the 
deployment of ideational power.  
Table 1: Consensus or compromise 
Type of agreement pursued  Background ideational 
assessment 
Foreground discursive action 
and type of ideational power 
Consensus for first-best 
option 
Ideational and institutional 
context is supportive of 
preferences or is sufficiently 
pliable to achieve preferences 
Persuasion (power through 
ideas) 
Coercion (power over or in 
ideas) 
Compromise to achieve 
‘something rather than 
nothing’ 
Ability to realise first-best 
preferences is constrained by 
context or others’ power over 
or in ideas 
Concession through adopting 
less optimal policy 
preferences (power through 
ideas allows recognition of 
limits to consensus) 
Reframing to address 
opponents’ argument directly 
(and persuade acceptance of 
compromise through ideas) 
 
 
 
3 Methods 
The research was based on a qualitative ‘holistic’ single case study (Yin, 2014) that mirrored other 
theory-testing CCA studies (Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014, Gillard, 2016), using the New Zealand 
ZCA/ETR Bill process as a focal point for deeper examination of relationships between discursive 
strategising and policy decisions. Process tracing was used to uncover the discursive strategies 
employed from the inception of the policy process to its adoption, with a particular emphasis on 
agenda setting and policy negotiation. This technique tests theoretical propositions in political 
processes over time by disaggregating them into key decision points (Bennett and Checkel, 2014). In 
this study, we trace the evolution of New Zealand framework climate legislation through four 
temporally sequential stages to understand how different discursive strategies influenced policy 
development. To construct a timeline of the process, primary, secondary and tertiary material were 
analysed and events triangulated.  
The empirical material was drawn mainly from public documents but one semi-structured interview 
was conducted with an individual involved in the NGO Generation Zero to explore and validate 
interpretations of informal processes and timelines. This empirical material was supported by insights 
on debates surrounding New Zealand climate policy gained from 23 expert interviews conducted with 
politicians, government officials, business groups, NGOs and independent commentators for a 
previous research project, which were used indirectly to help interpret the discursive and policy 
positions of different actor groups for the present study (Inderberg and Bailey, 2019). The following 
sources were used to map the policy positions of different actors at different stages of the policy 
process against the main arguments used to justify these stances:  
(i) Publications by organisations promoting the ZCA; 
(ii) Consultations and reports on the ZCA and ETR Bill, including: government discussion 
documents produced to accompany the ZCA consultation; submissions from industry, 
NGOs and other groups and individuals; and analyses of consultation findings; 
(iii) Texts of the Bills and Supplementary Order Papers; 
(iv) Hansard records of the bills’ parliamentary readings; 
(v) Cabinet papers and regulatory impact analyses of measures to manage livestock and 
fertiliser emissions; and industry submissions proposing alternatives to mandatory pricing 
of livestock and fertiliser emissions. 
4 The development of New Zealand’s Zero Carbon Act 
The concept of CCAs as multi-faceted legislative frameworks that mandate long-term targets and 
policy actions for mitigating greenhouse gases (GHGs) (Nash and Steurer, 2019; Nachmany et al., 2015) 
is not new. Since the UK Climate Change Act in 2008, CCAs have undergone global diffusion via 
transnational policy entrepreneurship, policy transfer, and lesson-drawing, often emulating and 
adapting the UK model (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Lorenzoni and Benson, 2014). CCAs now exist in 
multiple national and sub-national political contexts (e.g. Nash, 2021; Torney, 2017; 2019), including 
the Norway Climate Change Act 2017, Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change 2012 and Peru’s 
Framework Law on Climate Change 2018. As one innovative CCA to emerge from this global learning 
paradigm, the development of the New Zealand ZCA is now mapped across four successive phases. 
 
 
4.1 Phase one: Generation Zero and the ZCA genesis 
Although political debates on reforming New Zealand climate policy had been ongoing since prior to 
the introduction of the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) in 2008, one of the main 
entrepreneurial drivers creating agendas for a new legal framework was Generation Zero, a youth-
based NGO that had been active on climate issues since 2010 (Generation Zero, 2020). Generation 
Zero published a series of reports during this early period that drew on international precedents to 
lobby for more ambitious New Zealand climate policy (Generation Zero, 2014). In particular, the 
reports stressed the UK CCA’s use of legally binding emissions targets, carbon budgets, and the 
creation of an independent oversight and advisory committee. Emulation of the UK was also apparent 
in its second report’s title, The Big Ask, which echoed the citizen campaign to support the 
establishment of the UK CCA (Carter and Childs, 2018). Generation Zero’s campaign nevertheless 
stressed that New Zealand climate policy should reflect the needs of its trade-exposed and primary-
sector dependent economy. 
In 2016, following adoption of the Paris Agreement, the group began advocating explicitly for 
legislation that would create cross-party commitment to an ambitious, long-term decarbonisation 
programme and end partisan wrangling over the direction of New Zealand climate policy (Mclaren, 
2019; Interview). Inspired by the unusually high degree of cross-party agreement exhibited during the 
passage of the UK’s CCA, Generation Zero’s view was that ensuring broad political support was 
indispensable to securing meaningful and durable legislation within New Zealand’s plural party mixed-
member proportional (MMP) and short (three-year) electoral system.  
The group’s tactics of direct action and conventional political activities (Dodson and Papoutsaki, 2017; 
Noronha, 2013) became a large-scale communication exercise to mobilise public support, 
simultaneously articulating philosophical ideas (climate challenges facing New Zealand), 
programmatic ideas (framework climate legislation) and policy ideas (the proposed Act’s features). 
The campaign incorporated both online and traditional campaigning, including events like Zero Carbon 
Act: The most important legislation for our generation (June 2016); and International case studies and 
lessons for New Zealand, which again drew on other countries’ experiences to argue for a New Zealand 
CCA (Generation Zero, 2017a). Effort was also invested in coordinative networking, using personal and 
other NGO connections to engage business and primary-sector actors, as well as influencing local 
politics through an “adopt an MP” campaign encouraging communities to lobby their parliamentary 
representatives. Further coordinative activity focused on strengthening the political acceptability of 
Generation Zero’s policy ideas by seeking advice from a non-partisan group of academics, politicians, 
and other professionals on how to design economically and politically viable legislation for New 
Zealand. 
In April 2017, Generation Zero’s policy team launched its “blueprint” for a “Zero Carbon Act” that 
adapted elements of the UK CCA to reflect Treaty of Waitangi1 requirements, New Zealand’s Pacific 
responsibilities, and the country’s emissions profile (Generation Zero, 2017b). It also represented the 
group’s first major decision on whether to compromise on how it lobbied for a ZCA. To promote non-
partisan politics and diffuse tensions between the environmental and agricultural communities, it 
endorsed a ‘two-baskets approach’ that recommended different legal treatment of long-lived (mainly 
carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide), and short-lived GHGs (mainly methane associated with agriculture) 
(Generation Zero, 2017b). By incorporating scientifically recognised differences in methane’s physical 
 
1 The Treaty of Waitangi was signed by representatives of the British Crown and Māori Chiefs in 1840 and has a 
significant role in framing political relations between the Maori population and the New Zealand Government. 
 
 
properties into its blueprint (Cain et al., 2019), Generation Zero hoped to make its proposals palatable 
to agricultural interests, though it never intended this discursive compromise to signal diminished 
ambition to reduce short-lived GHGs (Interview). 
The blueprint was supported by influential organisations including Forest & Bird, WWF-New Zealand, 
Oxfam NZ, and some businesses (Generation Zero, 2018). Another objective for Generation Zero was 
to secure support from New Zealand’s youth political parties (Nationals, Labour, Greens, New Zealand 
First (NZ First) and Māori Party) to reinforce the idea that the ZCA transcended party politics. Support 
from the Young Nationals was especially important as a way of encouraging the National 
parliamentary party to support cross-parliamentary working on the ZCA (Interview). However, 
Generation Zero purposefully avoided overt political endorsements for its blueprint that might 
compromise its party-neutral status and when the Green Party cited the ZCA blueprint in its 2017 
election manifesto, Generation Zero requested its removal. 
The other major source of momentum during the ZCA’s agenda-setting phase came from closer to the 
political establishment, when in 2015 the prominent Greens politician, Kennedy Graham, founded 
GLOBE-NZ to advance cross-party collaboration on climate change2. Graham enlisted representatives 
from New Zealand’s six main parties to participate in briefings and discussions on climate change. The 
briefings from scientists, politicians and business leaders played an important coordinative role in 
“bind[ing] a disparate group of New Zealand parliamentarians” towards the goal of net-zero emissions 
(Graham, 2018: 38), which GLOBE-NZ sought to extend by commissioning Vivid Economics to conduct 
a study of pathways for achieving net-zero emissions. Vivid examined options ranging from reliance 
on international offsets to strategies combining innovation, shifts from pastoral agriculture, and 
extensive afforestation, while its conclusions contained several measures aligned with the CCA 
concept, including the need for cross-party agreement to enhance policy coherence and predictability, 
and the creation of independent statutory institutions to assist with the development of national 
climate policy (Vivid Economics, 2017). 
Strong public interest in the report led to a special debate in Parliament in April 2017, where – 
although a CCA was never mentioned directly – the Greens co-leader, James Shaw, committed the 
party to net zero by 2050, Labour called for stronger action, and NZ First and the Māori Party 
representatives indicated the importance of achieving net zero by 2050 (New Zealand Parliament, 
2017). This was followed in 2017 by two GLOBE-NZ sponsored consultancy papers examining pathways 
towards net zero by 2050 and ways to strengthen emissions pricing that helped to shape New Zealand 
political discourse further towards how, rather than whether, to pursue net-zero emissions (Leining, 
2017; Young, 2017). Reflecting on the GLOBE-NZ initiative, Graham expressed the belief that it helped 
to bridge entrenched divides in New Zealand politics by creating a forum where members could 
analyse issues and express views with “more political fluidity than would normally be found in the 
debating chamber” (Graham, 2018: 43). 
By this juncture, the Greens and Labour had become critical ZCA entrepreneurs, with Labour arguing 
in its 2017 election manifesto that “It is not good enough to say we [New Zealand] are too small to 
matter—most countries individually could claim the same” (Labour, 2017). NZ First similarly pledged 
to establish a UK/Norwegian style CCA, and although National’s manifesto did not mention a CCA, it 
did not oppose the idea. When Labour’s electoral performance enabled it to form a coalition 
government with NZ First supported by a ‘confidence-and-supply’ agreement with the Greens, Prime 
Minister Jacinda Ardern spoke about her determination for New Zealand to be on the right side of 
 
2 GLOBE-NZ is a chapter of GLOBE International, a non-profit entity founded in 1989 to advance cooperation on 
climate change and sustainable development. 
 
 
history on climate change and appointed the Greens’ James Shaw as Minister for Climate Change. 
Endorsement of the ZCA proposal by the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment in March 2018 (WWF New Zealand, 2018a) gave the government further encouragement 
to launch consultations on proposals for a CCA in June 2018. 
 
4.2 Phase two: the Zero Carbon Consultation 
The consultation, Our Climate Your Say, was pivotal in the government’s efforts to build support for 
the ZCA (Ministry for the Environment, 2018a). In courting views from business, agriculture, forestry, 
civil society groups, Māori communities, local government and the public, the government – having 
taken the reins of policy entrepreneurship on the ZCA – sought to secure a mandate to underpin 
negotiations with potentially resistant political and business actors. The consultation discussion 
document emphasised the risks of climate change to businesses and society, New Zealand’s moral 
duty to protect future generations and the Pacific region, and the country’s significance to global 
mitigation efforts: 
“Although New Zealand’s share of global emissions is very small (0.17%)…. The Zero Carbon 
Bill is an opportunity for New Zealand to decide how it delivers its part in the global effort 
while encouraging action by others” (Ministry for the Environment, 2018a, p. 9). 
 
On the programmatic level, the document explored the capacity for a ZCA to promote innovation, 
employment, the Māori economy, cleaner air, resilient ecosystems, efficient and comfortable homes, 
and reduced traffic (Ministry for the Environment, 2018a). Having framed the government’s stance, 
the document then sought opinions on policy options, including long-term emissions targets, carbon 
budgets, protecting trade-exposed sectors, an independent Climate Change Commission, and 
adaptation policy (Ministry for the Environment, 2018a).  
The document also discussed transition challenges, including the risks of reduced economic growth, 
industrial decline, unemployment, and carbon leakage to countries with less stringent climate policies 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2018a, p. 19). Although such messages arguably provided ammunition 
to potential ZCA opponents, they also demonstrated the government’s alertness to negative 
outcomes and its commitment to a fair and inclusive transition (ibid. p. 11). Equally, if the consultation 
gained broad-based support, it would signal to political opponents that New Zealand accepted these 
challenges. 
The consultation received 15,009 submissions, including around 9,500 pro-forma letters submitted 
using templates developed by Greenpeace, Generation Zero and other activist organisations (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2018b). Two recurring themes are identifiable within the discourses and 
arguments used by affected groups and other respondents: (i) recognition of the need for action and 
the ZCA; and (ii) defence of respondents’ interests and involvement in the policy process. Industry 
organisations like BusinessNZ that had previously resisted strengthening of the ETS indicated 
principled support for the ZCA and presented themselves as active decarbonisation partners 
(BusinessNZ, 2018). Similarly, Fonterra, New Zealand’s dominant dairying cooperative, signalled its 
commitment to the ZCA’s principles (Fonterra, 2018). However, business acceptance of the ZCA was 
not unconditional. BusinessNZ criticised the government’s modelling and methodology for 
determining emissions targets, arguing that it could: 
 
 
“…foreshadow the implementation of policies aimed at achieving them regardless of the 
economic and social consequences.” (BusinessNZ, 2018, p. 2) 
 
Fonterra petitioned for involvement in policy design to recognise the dairying sector’s importance to 
the economy and global food security, the technical and economic challenges of reducing methane, 
and the need to manage the ZCA’s social and economic impacts on agricultural communities: 
“A significant and rapid approach to reducing methane is likely to have negative economic and 
social impacts on the agriculture sector that could be avoided.” (Fonterra, 2018, p. 4) 
 
Forestry related organisations similarly sought to align the ZCA with their commercial interests, 
arguing for 30-year rather than five-year carbon budgets to reflect forestry investment cycles (Wood 
Processors and Manufacturers Association, 2018). The New Zealand Farm Forestry Association 
focused on strengthening forestry representation in the Climate Change Commission (New Zealand 
Farm Forestry Association, 2018), while regional governments emphasised the need to give councils 
and non-government actors meaningful roles in New Zealand’s zero-carbon strategies to ensure just 
and equitable transitions (Auckland Council, 2018; Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2018). 
Generation Zero also championed society-wide involvement in the ZCA to safeguard just treatment 
for Māori communities (Generation Zero, 2018b), while WWF-New Zealand cited the experience of its 
UK office with the UK CCA to highlight its credentials to assist in developing the ZCA (WWF New 
Zealand, 2018b). 
Another feature of many submissions was claims by organisations to represent large constituencies. 
The Sustainable Business Council reported that its submission was based on consultation with 95 
member companies that accounted for 29% of New Zealand’s private sector revenue and 9% of its 
workforce (Sustainable Business Council, 2018). Similarly, the New Zealand Farm Forestry Association 
submission was presented on behalf 14,000 forest owners (New Zealand Farm Forestry Association, 
2018). So, although the government’s consultation strategy secured cross-societal backing for a ZCA, 
it also highlighted that significant coordination work was still needed to ensure the legislation was 
acceptable to groups that remained wary of its economic and social implications. 
4.3 Phase three: legislating the Zero Carbon Act 
Despite cross-party support for the idea of a ZCA, coalition politics played an important role in shaping 
the legislation introduced to Parliament. In particular, NZ First opposed allowing the Climate Change 
Commission powers to set carbon budgets independently and expressed reservations about imposing 
‘world-leading’ obligations on agriculture (Cooke, 2019). In seeking to resolve these issues, James 
Shaw was reported as saying he was ‘more interested in a lasting law than a perfect one’ and that he 
placed a premium on building bipartisan support over pressing his party’s desire for stronger measures 
for agriculture (Cooke, 2019).  
Once a compromise had been agreed, the ZCA enjoyed general support from the majority of parties, 
including the main opposition National Party, during its passage through Parliament. Representatives 
from across the political divide praised James Shaw for his stewardship of the ZCA and for seeking and 
securing National’s agreement on the legislation, and the debates were characterised by regular 
affirmation of each party’s commitment to shared normative and cognitive ideas, in particular:  
(i) the need for accelerated action;  
 
 
(ii) the need for framework legislation to provide predictable investment and innovation 
signals;  
(iii) flexibility in how policy responded to changes in scientific evidence and economic 
conditions; 
(iv) the importance of justice and inclusivity within New Zealand’s climate policy response 
(New Zealand Parliament, 2019a; 2019b; 2019c).  
The mood of the debates nevertheless became combative at times as National invoked New Zealand’s 
status as a small trading nation to portray the ZCA’s agriculture provisions as unsupported by scientific 
or economic evidence and risking harm to rural communities and other vulnerable sections of society 
(Cooper and Rosin, 2014; Driver et al., 2018; Richter and Chambers, 2014)3. National representatives 
argued that tougher regulations for agriculture than existed in other countries reflected a misguided 
attempt at international leadership and pressed for less demanding targets, measures to prevent 
productive agricultural land being converted to forestry, greater use of international credits, and 
clearer plans for innovation and technology development (New Zealand Parliament, 2019a). 
Despite cross-party agreement on the idea of fair and just transitions, disagreements again persisted 
over its interpretation. For example, National argued during the ZCA’s second reading that: 
“…the so-called just transition needs to be measured and only move through at a pace in 
which everybody is comfortable.” (New Zealand Parliament, 2019b) 
Government interpretations, meanwhile, stressed New Zealand’s moral obligations to future 
generations and its Pacific neighbours, the legislation’s capacity to strengthen agriculture’s 
competitiveness, and farmers’ willingness to embrace the low-emissions challenge: 
“Whether farmers talked about how they recognised that farming practice had to change… to 
their credit [they] came to talk about how that should be managed. Not to oppose it, but to 
talk about management.” (Duncan Webb, Labour, New Zealand Parliament, 2019b). 
The repeated calls for amendments suggest that the political consensus over the ZCA only extended 
to its principles and framework, while detailed programmatic and policy measures remained 
susceptible to challenge. Although National’s support gave the government few reasons to moderate 
the ZCA, the introduction of several amendments in its second reading following a further consultation 
by the cross-party Parliamentary Environment Committee underlined the need for continued 
coordinative activity and compromise to maintain industry and opposition cooperation. Scott 
Simpson, National Spokesperson for Climate Change, flagged the potential for a return to adversarial 
climate politics while proposing a Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) amendment during the ZCA’s 
committee stage: 
“… [we] hope that the Government will take notice of our clear intent in producing and 
preparing these SOPs. It’s likely that if the SOPs that we put forward are not accepted… the 
potential for change at a future date remains high, and I’m sure that’s not the purpose of the 
Minister’s intent in trying to get cross-party support.” (New Zealand Parliament, 2019d). 
To navigate the legislative process, the government faced several discursive and policy choices that 
potentially affected the legislation’s capacity to deliver economy-wide emissions reductions. These 
included which arguments to press to defend the ZCA’s integrity, how far to accommodate alternative 
arguments, and whether (and how) to amend provisions on agricultural emissions. Its discursive 
 
3 Only the libertarian party ACT argued that New Zealand was incapable of contributing to meaningful change 
through its actions (Inderberg and Bailey, 2019). 
 
 
strategy can be characterised as seeking to “cover all bases” by simultaneously stressing philosophical 
ideas about climate change threats, normative ideas about the moral case for action, cognitive ideas 
about improving economic competitiveness and quality of life, and coordinative commitments to 
fairness and mitigating adverse economic and social impacts. Its policy strategy in turn could be 
described as “keeping the door latched but ajar” by retaining the ZCA’s ambitious targets, 
independent policy scrutiny, and policy priorities while deferring detailed negotiations on how to 
achieve the ZCA’s ambitions to the next stage of the policy process (Leining et al., 2020). 
4.4 Phase 4: Action to achieve the ZCA’s goals 
The Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading Reform) Amendment Bill (ETR Bill) formed separate 
legislation to the ZCA but is pivotal to understanding the politics of the ZCA’s development for two 
reasons. First, the ETS remains New Zealand’s dominant policy instrument for reducing emissions, so 
its design is critical to realising the ZCA’s ambitions (Bertram and Terry, 2010; Driver et al., 2018). 
Second, the ETS has been heavily criticised since its introduction, among other things, for exempting 
livestock and fertiliser emissions because of concerns about economic impacts and carbon leakage 
from the relocation of agricultural production to other countries (Inderberg et al., 2017). 
To address these issues, the government proposed reforms to the ETS that included pricing farm 
livestock emissions and processor fertiliser emissions. The Primary Sector Leaders Group remained 
wary of mandatory pricing without clear mechanisms to cut emissions economically and proposed an 
industry-government agreement (He Waka Eke Noa) to build capability for farm-level ETS 
participation or – agriculture’s preferred option – meeting emissions targets without ETS surrender 
obligations. The government’s strategy for upholding the ZCA’s ambitions without alienating 
agriculture or fracturing the political consensus underpinning the ZCA consisted of: continued 
negotiation with agricultural leaders to strengthen the proposed agreement’s alignment with the ZCA; 
regulatory impact analysis of the agreement versus pricing livestock and fertiliser emissions in the ETS; 
further stakeholder consultation; and messaging about the government’s constructive working with 
agriculture to counter opposition aspersions that policy was driven by ideology rather than practicality 
and fairness: 
“We are pleased the Government are finally getting alongside farmers… it's nice to see they've 
finally learned that you can work with the sector to get the results that you need.” (Erica 
Stanford, National, New Zealand Parliament, 2019e). 
The regulatory impact analysis concluded that farm-level livestock and processor-level fertiliser 
emissions pricing would be more effective in reducing emissions and enjoyed public support (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2019a). However, it also cited lack of stakeholder buy-in as a threat to the policy’s 
durability, arguing that an industry agreement might be viable if the sector accepted agricultural 
emissions pricing from 2025, resolved issues around the agreement’s governance and funding, and 
the government reserved the right to introduce a processor-level scheme before 2025 by Order in 
Council (bypassing parliamentary approval) if progress in implementing the agreement was 
unsatisfactory (Ministry for the Environment/Ministry for Primary Industries, 2019). 
In October 2019, James Shaw sought final cabinet agreement on measures to reduce agricultural 
emissions.  His recommendations recognised the need for flexibility and pricing within a broader policy 
package but recommended processor-level livestock and fertiliser pricing from 2021 (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2019b). However, cabinet opted instead for a modified sector agreement while 
 
 
maintaining farm-level livestock obligations and processor-level fertiliser obligations from 20254 
(Cabinet Office, 2019). How far the cabinet rejected the climate minister's recommendations, or 
decided upon the outcome he had anticipated all along, is unclear.  Either way, it represented a key 
policy response to risks to the ZCA of pursuing the government’s “first best” policy option.  
This phase of the policy process centred mainly on policy choices rather than discursive manoeuvring, 
although the consultation provided further opportunities for public debate on agriculture’s climate 
responsibilities5. The government also continued to deploy communicative and coordinative 
messaging to sell the deal to opposition parties and industry while reassuring activist and public 
audiences of its commitment to tackling climate change. Despite the government’s attempts to 
coordinate political support by stressing its partnership with agriculture, it failed to dissuade National 
from voting against the ETR Bill on the grounds that its economic impacts had received insufficient 
scrutiny following disruptions to parliamentary procedures caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The 
government’s parliamentary majority ensured the ETR Bill’s passage in June 2020, but National’s 
opposition raises doubts about whether it will enjoy continued support from future governments. 
5 Discussion 
The New Zealand ZCA and ETR Bills were subject to a variety of discursive interventions by policy 
entrepreneurs during their development. A critical question returning to our theoretical framework 
(Section 2) is whether, when and how these actors chose to compromise to secure a deal, or to 
maintain their ‘first-best’ preferences and attempt to expand or enforce a consensus. We discuss the 
findings in relation to two core themes: the idea of consensus politics as a fundamental prerequisite 
for climate change legislation; and the compromises required to secure it. 
5.1 Consensus 
A fundamental lesson that New Zealand actors drew from the UK’s experiences was that ambitious 
long-term climate-change legislation was impossible without broad-based political ‘consensus’ (New 
Zealand Parliament, 2019b). Seeking the broadest possible support was pivotal to Generation Zero’s 
agenda-setting strategy and, throughout the ZCA consultations, the government worked in both the 
policy and discursive spheres to demonstrate that the concerns of potential political opponents and 
key interest groups were being addressed. Business, agriculture and forestry were particular targets 
for these coordinative efforts but so too were other major groups, such as the Māori community. The 
depth of communicative engagement with citizens is equally evident in the Generation Zero campaign 
and the ZCA consultation response. Public awareness of climate issues and familiarity with arguments 
about the ZCA rose to unprecedented levels during this period. 
Maintaining political and business support for the ZCA nevertheless required the government to 
articulate a spectrum of messages. During Parliamentary readings, normative ideas about the moral 
case for action were combined with messages stressing the ZCA’s economic and social benefits and 
the government’s commitment to a fair and equitable transition. This attempt to “cover all bases” 
reflected important choices between ‘first-best’ idealism and ‘second-best’ pragmatism. Continuing 
 
4 In another demonstration of coalition politics, this decision also included 95% free allocation of ETS allowances 
to honour the coalition agreement between Labour and NZ First, and processor-level obligations on livestock 
emissions from 2025 if farm-level obligations were not implemented. In return, NZ First moved away from its 
2017 election commitment to replace the ETS with a CCA, indicating another compromise by its leadership. 
5 The ETR Bill also introduced forestry reforms, reflecting forestry’s importance to New Zealand’s climate 
strategy. 
 
 
to focus on the threats of climate change limited the scope for all-out attacks on the legislation but, if 
used to excess, could (and did) lead to accusations of marginalising alternative concerns (New Zealand 
Parliament, 2019b). Conversely, economic and equity framings demonstrated sensitivity to these 
concerns but exposed aspects of the ZCA to criticism and renegotiation. Striking a balance between 
normative framings that provide the motive force for action and cognitive framings about how action 
should proceed can thus be critical to maintaining long-term cooperation and achieving CCA goals. 
They also highlight the need for governments to accommodate and assimilate alternative ideas rather 
than attempting to win debates by “hard-selling” preferred ideas, exerting power through and in ideas 
rather than over ideas. 
5.2 Compromise 
The critical challenge for Generation Zero during its campaign was to engage its discursive abilities to 
build decisive support among political parties, business, and society for integrated, long-term climate 
action. It exerted considerable power through ideas as it constructed and communicated cognitive 
and normative rationales for ambitious climate action based on climate science, international 
exemplars, programmatic messages about the risks of climate change, and appeals to New Zealand’s 
moral obligations. 
While this aspirational messaging allowed Generation Zero and, later, entrepreneurs within the 
government to broaden support for the ZCA, they also made strategic assessments of political 
feasibility that led them to modulate their preferences. In particular, they decided to adopt the ‘two-
baskets approach’ early in the process, not because they wanted less ambitious targets for short-lived 
GHGs, but to diffuse future challenges to the ZCA from the agricultural sector and National Party by 
recognising the different physical properties of these gases (Interview). This attempt to mitigate a 
potential obstacle to the ZCA indicates CCA entrepreneurs’ sensitivity to endogenous constraints on 
their capacity to use discursive skill to galvanise New Zealand climate policy. By modulating their 
discursive approach, Generation Zero and government negotiators sought to reconcile their 
motivating commitment to economy-wide emissions reductions with the pragmatic need for 
agreement. Whether or not the two-baskets approach was regarded as a ‘second-best’ alternative, 
the repercussions of this decision persisted throughout the subsequent process and arguably created 
the conditions for fractures in the political consensus to reform the ETS. 
From one perspective, the fact that CCA entrepreneurs from both inside and outside government both 
saw legislation which did not differentiate between GHGs as politically unviable reflects the ‘power in 
ideas’ held by the agricultural lobby that became ‘hardwired’ into New Zealand policy-making and 
discourse when the entry of agricultural biological emissions into the ETS was deferred in 2008. 
Advocates for climate action in effect made the agricultural sector’s main arguments for them in 
advance by emphasising agriculture’s economic importance and the technical and economic 
challenges of reducing livestock and fertiliser emissions. However, the agricultural sector would 
undoubtedly have made these arguments anyway (Cooper and Rosin, 2014). By anticipating these 
concerns while stressing normative ideas about the need for action and cognitive ideas about 
protecting agriculture, climate policy entrepreneurs avoided entrenchment by inviting and challenging 
agriculture to work cooperatively on climate issues. So, although the two-baskets approach left 
difficulties in negotiating legislation to reduce agricultural emissions, it equally illustrates policy 
entrepreneurs flexing ‘power in ideas’ in the hope of facilitating the institutionalisation of new 
ideational structures and expectations in New Zealand climate policy. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
One assessment of the ZCA might be that developing the political agreement needed to pass and 
sustain the legislation necessitated strategic avoidance of difficult political challenges. The argument 
continues that, where points of contention exist, there is a heightened risk that political agreements 
remain fragile, and that interest-driven politics will, sooner or later, resurface to challenge the 
intentions and mechanisms of CCAs. This remains an open question. The policy consensus that 
enabled the UK CCA, for example, was tested during debates over setting of the fourth carbon budget, 
which was only confirmed after a review, but has remained generally secure (Averchenkova et al, 
2020; Gillard, 2016; Lockwood, 2013. One reading is that the New Zealand ZCA has been made more 
vulnerable by the strength of its links to more contentious policies like the NZ ETS. 
Either way, the contemporary outcome of historical processes in New Zealand has been a normative 
and cognitive environment in which agricultural concerns continue to exert a strong influence on 
policy ideas and discourse. Difficulties exist in openly challenging such embedded truths, even for 
skilled policy entrepreneurs, and in such situations, incumbent industries can, to an extent, rely on 
‘power in ideas’ to fend off challenges to their exceptionalism. Path dependency, from this viewpoint, 
appears to create severe obstacles to policy change. The critical ingredient of CCAs, however, is a 
refashioned version of path dependency (Levin et al., 2012; Rietig and Laing, 2017; Rosenbloom et al., 
2019). Like other CCAs, the ZCA establishes principles and obligations for future climate policy-making 
and mechanisms for achieving and monitoring them (Nash and Steurer, 2019). As a result, CCAs create 
pathways for changing economic interests, or how political actors interpret and express those 
interests, that it is hoped will generate greater long-term support for strong climate action. In terms 
of DI, this involves developing strategies for deepening consensus over time, moving progressively 
from the normative, philosophical idea of climate action to the programmatic concept of framework 
legislation, and ultimately the cognitive ideas that underpin future agreements to achieve the 
ambitions of CCAs.  
Compromise is an indispensable part of the policy entrepreneur’s toolkit for achieving such shifts, 
especially where the objective is to re-define what is politically ‘possible’ over the long term. The 
power of compromise resides in the idea that something imperfect but ‘done’ is preferable to a perfect 
idea that never materialises. The degree to which contentious issues can be recast (and ideational 
power redistributed) in future policy-making as a result of the ZCA remains unclear, as does the 
potential for political hostilities to resume (Gillard and Lock, 2017). CCAs seek to turn climate politics 
away from outcomes where the compromises needed to reach agreement fatally undermine 
effectiveness. This contribution nevertheless indicates that navigating between ambition and 
durability remain central to theoretical and practical understandings of the politics of CCAs. A fruitful 
direction for applied policy research is therefore to develop insights that can inform climate policy 
entrepreneurs’ decisions about when, and when not, to compromise. 
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